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THE DELINQUENT STATE: ILLINOIS AND COMPLIANCE WITH 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
At Pinckneyville Correctional Center, one of the State of Illinois’s many 
prisons, a hardworking corrections officer attempts to subdue a schizophrenic 
inmate by wrestling him to the ground.1  As he forces the prisoner to the 
ground, the officer falls, striking his right elbow and right hand against the 
prison’s concrete floor.2  As a result of this injury, the officer seeks medical 
treatment with a hand and arm specialist who ultimately performs surgery to 
alleviate the officer’s symptoms.3  After his condition improves, the officer 
returns to work at the Pinckneyville prison.4  In order to recover expenses from 
his injury, the officer proceeds with a workers’ compensation claim, where an 
arbitrator orders his employer, the State of Illinois, to pay the medical bills 
accrued as a result of his hand and elbow injuries.5  Although the officer still 
suffers from some lingering symptoms in his wrist and elbow, he is pleased 
with the result of his surgery, and the arbitrator’s order, which required the 
State to pay the costs of his medical treatment.6 
However, soon after receiving the arbitrator’s decision, the recovering 
officer begins to receive collection notices regarding his previously accrued 
medical bills.7  If his debt is not paid, the notices indicate, the officer’s credit 
score will be affected.8  Confused and frustrated, the officer contacts his 
 
 1. This introduction is based on several workers’ compensation cases filed against the State 
of Illinois by its employees, mostly corrections officers in State prisons.  This particular injury is 
based on the case of Wece v. Pinckneyville Correctional Center, No. 08 WC 43914 (Ill. Workers’ 
Comp. Comm’n 2009) (Dibble, Arb.), aff’d, 11 I.W.C.C. 0673 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 
2011). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Wece, No. 08 WC 43914. 
 7. McDonald v. Pinckneyville Corr. Ctr., No. 04 WC 13082 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 
2010) (order); Petitioner’s Statement of Exceptions and Supporting Brief at 2, Starkweather v. 
Menard Corr. Ctr., No. 08 WC 030919 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2009). 
 8. See George Pawlaczyk & Beth Hundsdorfer, Menard Chief Among 60 Who’ve Gotten 
State Money for Injuries, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT, Jan. 17, 2011, http://www.bnd.com/ 
2010/12/19/1522293/state-foots-bill-for-hurt-guards.html (quoting attorney Thomas C. Rich, “‘I 
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attorney to ask why he has been receiving collection notices from the medical 
providers who performed his surgery, since the workers’ compensation 
judgment ordered his employer, the State, to pay for his medical bills.  After 
investigating the status of his client’s medical bills, the attorney discovers that, 
in contravention of the order of the arbitrator, the State has not made any 
payments to the officer’s medical providers.9  In order to protect the credit 
score and financial status of his client, the attorney files a petition for penalties 
under the Workers’ Compensation Act, which allows the injured employee and 
his attorney to collect extra monetary compensation when an employer does 
not pay the employee’s bills on time.10  When the prison guard and his attorney 
inquire into why the State has not paid the employee’s bills, the State, through 
its assistant attorney general, says that “the state cannot pay bills with money 
that it does not have.”11 
As many Illinois state employees have realized, for the past several years 
the State has been experiencing financial duress stemming from statewide and 
far-reaching budgetary problems.12  Although numerous other state-funded 
programs have received noted publicity, one greatly affected area which has 
only begun to receive public attention involves the impact this financial duress 
has had on the State’s injured employees and the workers’ compensation 
system.  In many instances, the State’s lack of funds has resulted in late 
payments to its employees’ medical providers, which, under the Act, triggers 
the imposition of penalties should the delay be considered “unreasonable or 
vexatious.”13  In fact, the State has sought to utilize its defense of financial 
duress in order to avoid the payment of Section 16, 19(k), and 19(l) penalties 
to its employees under the Workers’ Compensation Act.14  Furthermore, the 
State has asserted that as a governmental body, it should be due leniency by the 
Workers’ Compensation Commission due to its financial duress and remain 
exempt from timely payment of its employees’ medical bills and penalties 
under the Act.15 
Additionally, the State, by way of statute, has already excepted itself from 
other provisions regulating workers’ compensation benefits payable to its 
employees.  Section 2 of the Workers’ Compensation Act provides that an 
 
have clients whose credit ratings have gone down the toilet,’ because the state is late or fails to 
pay [for injured workers’ medical bills].”). 
 9. See id. (describing the “common state practice of not paying or delaying payment of 
[injured workers’] medical bills”). 
 10. See infra Part I.D (explaining the standards for the imposition of various penalties under 
the Workers’ Compensation Act). 
 11. Pawlaczyk & Hundsdorfer, supra note 8. 
 12. Bob Secter, Illinois Speeds Toward Financial Chaos, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 2010, § 1, at 4. 
 13. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/16 (2008); id. 305/19(k). 
 14. See infra Part III.B.1–2. 
 15. See infra Part III.B.1–2. 
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employer in the state may elect to provide and pay compensation for accidental 
injuries sustained by himself or any employee.16  Ordinarily, in order to qualify 
for “self-insurance,” as this coverage is called, an employer must meet certain 
requirements, including a demonstration of sufficient financial strength to meet 
workers’ compensation obligations in a timely manner.17  However, in the 
Illinois Administrative Code, it is noted that only private employers who are 
attempting to qualify for self-insurance must seek approval from the 
Commission in order to self-insure.18  In fact, the Illinois Administrative Code 
notes specifically that “[a] private employer does not include . . . the State of 
Illinois.”19  Furthermore, while private employers may have their self-insured 
status revoked if payments of bills are not made in a timely manner, the State 
is not subject to these rules, and no indication is given that the State’s self-
insured status can ever be revoked.20  As a result, the State essentially 
functions as a self-insured employer whose status cannot be revoked even if 
the State fails in its duty to provide compensation to its injured employees. 
These present circumstances in Illinois workers’ compensation, combined 
with the current financial strain placed on the State, have created an 
undesirable set of conditions for the employees of the State.  Many employees’ 
compensable medical bills remain unpaid by the State, their employer.21  As 
indicated, some employees have also received telephone calls or collection 
notices regarding these unpaid bills, and some have had their credit affected by 
these outstanding bills.22  While these employees have petitioned for penalties 
under the Act as a result of outstanding medical bills, the State has similarly 
asserted it will not pay these penalties due to its lack of funding.23  As a self-
insured employer, the State has an obligation to pay for its employees’ 
workers’ compensation benefits.24  However, since the State’s self-insured 
status cannot be revoked, and payments have not been forthcoming, the State’s 
employees are left essentially remediless, even in spite of all the protections 
provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act.25  The medical providers who 
supply treatment to the State’s employees are also constrained by small and 
 
 16. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2 (2008). 
 17. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7100.70 (2010). 
 18. Id. § 7100.70(a)(1)(A). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. § 7100.70. 
 21. See, e.g., McDonald v. Pinckneyville Corr. Ctr., No. 04 WC 13082 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. 
Comm’n 2010) (order). 
 22. See supra note 7. 
 23. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 24. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2 (2008). 
 25. See id. (stating that employers who elect to self-insure, such as the State, are bound to 
pay for their employees injuries); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7100.70 (2010) (excluding the 
State from the filing requirements of private self-insurers). 
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mostly ineffective remedies.  Under the Act, in the case of delinquent 
payments made by employers, medical providers are only entitled to one 
percent interest accruing per month on their bill.26 
While not all employers within the State are subject to the laws of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act, the State itself is compelled to comply with these 
statutes.27  As a self-insured employer, the State is subject to its own laws, 
which require timely payment of an employee’s compensable medical bills.28  
If any other Act-bound employer does not comply with the Commission’s 
specified payment schedule, it is compelled to pay penalties under the Act.29  
Additionally, self-insured employers, with the exception of the State, are 
required to pay penalties, even in spite of financial duress.30 
In light of its own laws, as well as the financial constraints placed on its 
employees due to delinquent payment of their medical bills, the State should be 
forced to comply with the laws of the State and compelled to pay penalties 
under the Workers’ Compensation Act should it fail to pay its employees’ 
compensable medical bills pursuant to the Act.  Part I of this paper discusses 
the background and nuances of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 
including the provisions which govern the payment of medical bills and 
penalties.  Part II deals with the State as an employer and discusses the various 
laws that the State is both excepted from and subject to.  Finally, Part III 
discusses the current financial constrains placed on the State, the resulting 
failure of the State to pay its employees’ medical bills, and the ramifications of 
the State’s financial circumstances on its own employees. 
I.  ILLINOIS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT: BACKGROUND 
A. Scope of the Workers’ Compensation Act 
According to precedent set by the Illinois Supreme Court in Shell Oil 
Company v. Industrial Commission, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act is 
intended to provide financial protection for employees who sustain accidents 
arising out of and in the course of employment.31  Essentially, this language 
indicates a two-part test which an employee must meet in order to receive 
compensation: the injury must “arise out of” and occur “in the course of 
employment.”32  “[A]n injury arises out of one’s employment, if, at the time of 
 
 26. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8.2(d) (2008). 
 27. Id. 305/3. 
 28. Id. 305/8.2(d) (requiring payment to be made within 60 days). 
 29. Id. 305/16, 305/19(k), 305/19(l). 
 30. Id. 305/2 (stating that all employers who elect to comply with the Act are bound by the 
Act to all of his or her employees). 
 31. Shell Oil Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 119 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Ill. 1954). 
 32. See id. at 226, 228. 
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the occurrence, the employee was performing acts [the employee] was 
instructed to perform by his employer, acts which he had a common law or 
statutory duty to perform, or acts the employee might reasonably be expected 
to perform incident to his assigned duties.”33  Similarly, “[t]he requirement that 
the injury occur ‘in the course of’ employment is concerned with the ‘time, 
place, and circumstances of the injury.’”34  In order to meet these requirements, 
the employee claimant has the burden to show that the injury arose out of and 
in the course of employment by a preponderance of credible evidence.35 
B. Application of the Workers’ Compensation Act to Employers 
Another important aspect of the Workers’ Compensation Act includes a 
determination of which employers are subject to its provisions.  While most of 
the employers who operate businesses within the state are governed by the 
specifications of the Act, these employers fall into one of two categories: those 
who are compelled to automatically subscribe to the Act and those who elect to 
comply.36  The employers who are bound by statute to comply with the 
Workers’ Compensation Act include “enterprises or businesses which are 
declared to be extra hazardous”; in addition, it applies automatically to “the 
State, county, city, town, township, incorporated village or school district, 
body politic or municipal corporation.”37  The other group of employers who 
subscribe to the Act do so voluntarily: “[a]n employer in [the] State . . . may 
elect to provide and pay compensation . . . according to the provisions of [the 
Workers’ Compensation] Act.”38  In addition, the Act is extraterritorial; any 
workers hired in the State who perform jobs outside the state or leave the state 
for their employers are covered by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.39 
C. Treatment of Compensable Claims Under the Workers’ Compensation Act 
1. Procedural Aspects of Workers’ Compensation Claims 
All employers within the province of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 
those who subscribe voluntarily and automatically, are required to report 
employee accidents to the Workers’ Compensation Commission, the Illinois 
organization responsible for the administration and adjudication of statewide 
 
 33. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 541 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ill. 1989). 
 34. Paganelis v. Indus. Comm’n, 548 N.E.2d 1033, 1039 (Ill. 1989) (quoting Scheffler 
Greenhouses, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 362 N.E.2d 325, 327 (Ill. 1977)). 
 35. See id. at 1041. 
 36. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2, 305/3 (2008). 
 37. Id. 305/3. 
 38. Id. 305/2. 
 39. Id. 305/1(b)(2). 
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workers’ compensation claims.40  When an employer disputes liability for its 
employee’s injury, the first step in a legal proceeding to secure compensation 
involves a hearing conducted in front of an arbitrator, an expert on Illinois 
workers’ compensation law who acts as a judge and makes initial legal and 
factual findings of the case.41  After the arbitrator issues his or her decision 
relating to the compensability of the employee’s claim, that judgment stands as 
a final verdict unless the losing party appeals to the Workers’ Compensation 
Commission within thirty days after the arbitrator’s decision is filed with the 
Commission.42  If the arbitrator’s decision is appealed, the claim is reviewed 
by the Workers’ Compensation Commission, a panel of commissioners who 
specialize in workers’ compensation practice.43  Although the arbitrator has the 
opportunity to view the employee/claimant and make a finding on his or her 
credibility, the official finding of fact and legal determination of the claim is 
made by the Commission, who reviews the transcript of proceedings recorded 
at the employee’s arbitration hearing.44  Illinois courts have established that the 
factual and legal findings of the Commission “will not be disturbed unless they 
are against the manifest weight of the evidence.”45  As a result, once the 
Commission has made a determination on any aspect of the compensability of 
a claim, it is held to the “manifest weight of the evidence” standard of review 
and becomes difficult to overturn on appeal.46 
2. Payment of Medical Bills by Employers 
Once the Workers’ Compensation Commission, through the decision of 
either an arbitrator or a panel of commissioners, has determined that an 
employee’s injury “arose out of and in the course of” his or her employment,47 
employees are entitled to receive several benefits.48  Among others benefits, 
Section 305/8(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act specifies that the relevant 
employer shall provide and pay for all necessary medical aid “which is 
 
 40. See Paul A. Krauter, Basic Aspects of the Workers’ Compensation Act, in ILLINOIS 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PRACTICE § 1.4, at 1–9 (2009). 
 41. Cf. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7030 (2010) (describing the arbitration process including 
the assignment of an arbitrator, the rules of evidence, and requests for hearing). 
 42. Id. § 7040.70 (describing the process for review of arbitration decisions). 
 43. Id. §§ 7040.10–7040.80 (describing the process for Commission review). 
 44. City of Chicago v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 871 N.E.2d 765, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2007). 
 45. Id. at 778. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Shell Oil Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 119 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Ill. 1954). 
 48. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8 (2008) (outlining the amount of compensation owed to 
an injured employee).   Employers are also required to make these payments to medical providers 
on behalf of the injured employee if the relevant employer does not dispute legal responsibility 
for the compensable bills.  Id. 
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reasonably required to cure or relieve from the effects of the accidental 
injury.”49  The Act also specifies that the employer is responsible to make 
payments for the employee’s “treatment, instruction and training necessary for 
the physical, mental and vocational rehabilitation of the employee, including 
all maintenance costs and expenses incidental thereto.”50 
In addition to the specifications in the Act regarding which medical bills an 
employer is responsible to pay, the Workers’ Compensation Act also sets forth 
a medical “fee schedule,”51 which gives the Workers’ Compensation 
Commission the authority to establish the amount payable by employers to 
medical providers for services rendered to their injured employees.52  The 
specifications of the Fee Schedule include “payment rates, instructions, 
guidelines, and payment guides and policies regarding application of the 
schedule.”53  Through the authority provided in the Act54 the Commission 
adopted this fee schedule “to be used in setting the maximum allowable 
payment for a medical procedure, treatment or service covered under the 
Act.”55  While the amounts of payments required vary depending on the type 
of treatment or services rendered, the default rule established by the 
Commission specifies that medical providers shall be reimbursed at seventy-
six percent of actual charges.56 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 305/8.2(a). 
 52. Id. 305/8.2(d). 
 53. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7110.90(a) (2010). 
 54. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8.2(a) (2008). 
 55. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7110.90(a) (2010). 
 56. Id. § 7110.90(e).  In some instances, employees may choose to use their health insurance 
to pay for necessary medical treatment resulting from work-related injuries instead of 
immediately exercising their rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  While the reasons 
may vary as to why employees would choose to use their group health insurance instead of 
proceeding through workers’ compensation, oftentimes the use of health insurance results in more 
immediate treatment for the employee.  For example, in many circumstances medical providers 
are required to seek approval from an employee’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier before 
certain treatments can be given to an employee, essentially prohibiting the employee from 
receiving proper treatment and forcing him to live with pain while waiting for workers’ 
compensation insurance approval.  As a result, should an employee choose to use his group health 
insurance in order to receive treatment for a work-related injury, Section 8(j) of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act provides a remedy to these insurance providers.  820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
305/8(j)(1) (2008).  If the medical services paid by the employee’s group health insurance are 
considered to be the result of a compensable, work-related injury, the health insurance carrier is 
entitled to a credit against the employer for the amount paid.  Id.  The rationale for this provision 
revolves implicitly upon compensability of the injury and subsequent treatment.  See id.  Since an 
employer is responsible for all of the medical bills stemming from its employees’ work-related 
injuries, the employer, rather than group health insurance, should ultimately shoulder the burden 
of these medical bills. 
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The Act’s Medical Fee Schedule also specifies a default timeframe in 
which employers are required to make payments for their employee’s 
necessary care and treatment.57  Section (d) of the Fee Schedule provides that 
“[w]hen a patient notifies a provider that the treatment, procedure, or service 
being sought is for a work-related illness or injury and furnishes the provider 
the name and address of the responsible employer, the provider shall bill the 
employer directly.”58  Further the Act specifies the timeframe for payment: 
“[a]ll payments to providers for treatment provided pursuant to this Act shall 
be made within 60 days of receipt of the bills,” provided that all data necessary 
to adjudicate the relevant bills is provided.59  If the employer is unable or 
unwilling to pay the medical providers within the sixty-day window provided 
for in the Fee Schedule, the bill (or a portion thereof) accrues interest at a rate 
of one percent per month which is payable to the medical provider.60  The 
interest rate payable to providers set forth in the Medical Fee Schedule is one 
remedy available to medical providers should an employer fail to make timely 
payments of an employee’s bills.  However, oftentimes when these payments 
are delinquent, employees, as well as medical providers, may also suffer 
financially as a consequence.61  The Workers’ Compensation Act has 
anticipated such issues and as a result provides for specific types of deterrent 
penalties available for employees to collect against their employers in the face 
of the employer’s delinquent payments to medical providers.62 
D. Imposition of Penalties Under the Workers’ Compensation Act 
1. Overview 
Since its implementation one hundred years ago, the Workers’ 
Compensation Act has also provided for the remedy of additional 
compensation (hereinafter referred to as “penalties”) and the assessment of 
attorneys’ fees to its employees in certain cases.63  When an employer has 
engaged in an “unreasonable or vexatious delay” in failing to pay benefits to an 
injured worker, the Act makes these penalties available to employees.64  
Although the Act has always provided for the assessment of such penalties, the 
Commission has begun to apply them more liberally, and recent amendments 
 
 57. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8.2(d) (2008). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. For a more thorough discussion of the financial consequences suffered by employees as 
a result of delinquent payment of medical bills, see infra Part III.B.2. 
 62. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/16, 305/19(k), 305/19(l) (2008). 
 63. Krauter, supra note 40, § 1.18, at 1–32; George J. Picha, Procedure, Appeals, and 
Special Remedies, in ILLINOIS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PRACTICE § 5.51, at 5–45 (2009). 
 64. 37 Eleanor L. Grossman et al., ILL. LAW & PRAC. Workers’ Compensation § 151 (2009). 
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to the Act now allow for a greater assessment of these fees on employers, 
including new bases for their imposition.65 
Although not the primary focus of this discussion, one quasi-penalty is 
available to medical providers as a remedy for employers’ delinquent 
payments of employees’ medical bills resulting from work-related injuries.66  
Specifically, the Workers’ Compensation Act provides that employers are 
required to make payments to medical providers “within 60 days of receipt of 
the bills as long as the claim contains substantially all the required data 
elements necessary to adjudicate the bills.”67  When an employer fails to 
comply with this payment schedule, the medical provider’s bills begin to 
accrue interest at a rate of one percent per month payable to the medical 
provider.68  While this provision does provide these health care professionals 
with a small remedy, the actual impact of Section 8.2(d) is limited in that it 
provides little deterrence to employers from engaging in this type of delay, and 
usually does not adequately compensate medical providers for the payments 
which have not been forthcoming from employers and are often delayed for 
months at a time. 
Although the Act’s Fee Schedule provides for the aforementioned remedy 
to medical providers in the case of delayed payment regarding compensable 
medical bills,69 the Act and supplemental case law both provide that additional 
compensation in the form of penalties and attorneys’ fees are available to an 
employee in cases when medical expenses and/or temporary total 
compensation are not paid or when a delay in payment of such benefits 
occurs.70  In order to discourage employers from delaying payment of medical 
bills that have not been disputed or have been adjudicated compensable, the 
Workers’ Compensation Act provides three remedies to the employee 
claimant.  These remedial provisions are set forth in Sections 16, 19(k), and 
 
 65. Krauter, supra note 40, § 1.18, at 1–31 to  –32. 
 66. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8.2(d) (2008). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.; see supra Part I.C.2. 
 70. Picha, supra note 63, at § 5.51.  Although medical providers who provide treatment to an 
injured employee often bear the brunt of the financial loss when an employer fails to make 
payments pursuant to the Act, the remedies available to employees under Sections 16, 19(k), and 
19(l) are substantially greater than the 1% interest per month available to medical providers under 
Section 8.2(d).  See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8.2(d), 305/16, 305/19(k), 305/19(l) (2008).  The 
implicit rationale for the higher amount of penalties available to employees is due to standing 
issues.  Unlike employees, who file for penalties and benefits under the Workers’ Compensation 
Act, medical providers who render services to Illinois employees have no standing to file suit 
against such employers.  As a result, higher penalty rates are available to employees due to the 
fact that they are the only party available to collect them. 
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19(l) of the Act and vary in terms of standards for imposition as well as the 
amount of compensation provided by law.71 
2. Section 19(l) Penalty for Delay 
Three types of penalties, which are imposed and applied under two distinct 
standards, exist throughout the Workers’ Compensation Act.72  Sections 16 and 
19(k) penalties, provided for under the Workers’ Compensation Act, are 
discretionary and require the Commission to find that the employer engaged in 
“unreasonable and vexatious delay” by refusing to pay temporary total benefits 
and compensable medical bills.73  However, the other form of penalties 
available to employees under the Act, those specified under Section 19(l), are 
more readily obtainable and require a lesser standard than “unreasonable or 
vexatious delay.”74 
Section 19(l) of the Workers’ Compensation Act applies to injuries which 
occur after February 1, 2006, and specifically provides that: 
If the employee has made written demand for payment of benefits under 
Section 8(a) or Section 8(b) [temporary total benefits or payment of medical 
bills], the employer shall have 14 days after receipt of the demand to set forth 
in writing the reason for the delay.  In the case of demand for payment of 
medical benefits under Section 8(a), the time for the employer to respond shall 
not commence until the expiration of the allotted 60 days specified under 
Section 8.2(d).  In case the employer or his or her insurance carrier shall 
without good and just cause fail, neglect, refuse, or unreasonably delay the 
payment of benefits under Section 8(a) or Section 8(b), the Arbitrator or the 
Commission shall allow to the employee additional compensation in the sum 
of $30 per day for each day that the benefits under Section 8(a) or Section 8(b) 
have been so withheld or refused, not to exceed $10,000.  A delay in payment 
of 14 days or more shall create a rebuttable presumption of unreasonable 
delay.75 
It is important to note that an employer has only fourteen days to inform 
the employee in writing for the reason of nonpayment after receiving a written 
demand for payment of temporary total benefits under Section 8(b).76  
However, in the case of medical benefits, the commencement of the fourteen-
day response is extended by Section 8.2(d) of the Act as all medical benefits 
 
 71. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/16, 305/19(k), 305/19(l) (2008). 
 72. See infra Part I.D.2–4 (discussing in basic terms the three types of penalties provided for 
under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act). 
 73. See infra Part I.D.3–4. 
 74. Picha, supra note 63, § 5.52, at 5–46 (noting that “a higher standard is required for 
assessing § 19(k) penalties and § 16 attorneys’ fees” than for the penalty available under Section 
19(l)). 
 75. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(l) (2008). 
 76. Picha, supra note 63, § 5.52, at 5–47. 
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payments must be made “within 60 days of receipt of the bills as long as the 
claim contains substantially all the required data elements necessary to 
adjudicate the bills.”77  Additionally, under Section 19(l), when an employer 
delays payment by fourteen or more days as specified above, a rebuttable 
presumption of unreasonable delay is created.78  The critical test to determine 
when an employer does in fact have a “good and just cause” for disputing 
liability is again one of reasonableness.79  However, “[a]n employer’s reliance 
on its own physician as to appropriate treatment or the extent of the 
employee’s inability to work does not establish, by itself, that its challenge to 
liability for temporary total compensation was made in good faith.”80  In fact, 
“penalties under §19(l) . . . generally will not be awarded when the employer 
acts in reliance on a qualified medical opinion to dispute an employee’s 
entitlement to such benefits or when there are conflicting medical opinions.”81  
As a result of the rebuttable presumption which arises against the employer 
should he or she fail to make payments of an employee’s benefits after a 
written request has been submitted, Section 19(l) penalties are often the more 
commonly imposed form of additional compensation and are more easily 
obtained by decision of arbitrators and the Workers’ Compensation 
Commission.82 
3. Section 19(k) Delay in Payment of an Award 
The rules for imposition of Section 19(k) penalties also apply to the 
assessment of attorneys’ fees and costs, in that both penalties may be awarded 
for an “unreasonable or vexatious delay in the payment of medical 
expenses.”83  This standard, as specified by the court in McMahan v. Industrial 
Commission, illustrates that a “higher standard is required for section 19(k) 
penalties and section 16 attorney fees than for additional compensation under 
section 19(l).”84  Similarly, the standard for assessment of Section 19(k) 
penalties has been articulated in numerous judicial decisions of the Workers’ 
Compensation Commission and are cited throughout the Workers’ 
Compensation Practice handbook.85  First, the Commission has determined that 
the employer bears the initial burden in justifying a delay for payment of 
 
 77. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8.2(d) (2008). 
 78. Picha, supra note 63, § 5.52, at 5–47. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Picha, supra note 63, § 5.52, at 5–46 (noting the lower standard for Section 19(l) 
penalties and the mandatory $30-per-day penalty when the payment is late and the employer 
cannot show an adequate justification). 
 83. McMahan v. Indus. Comm’n, 702 N.E.2d 545, 551 (Ill. 1998). 
 84. McMahan, 702 N.E.2d at 553. 
 85. See Picha, supra note 63, § 5.58, at 5–51. 
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benefits.86  However, “[a]ssessment of penalties (and attorneys’ fees) is not 
proper if an employer’s nonpayment is based on a reasonable and good-faith 
challenge to liability” for the benefits to its employee, and additionally, that the 
critical test for this type of challenge involves the reasonableness of the 
belief.87  In order to meet the reasonableness test, an employer’s belief must be 
justified by facts “that a reasonable person in the employer’s position would 
have.”88 
As a result of the higher standards required to impose penalties under 
Section 19(k) of the Act, the amounts awarded in these instances can be 
substantial.  When unreasonable or vexatious delay of payment of 
compensation has been determined to exist by the Workers’ Compensation 
Commission, “then the Commission may award compensation additional to 
that otherwise payable under this Act equal to 50% of the amount payable at 
the time of such award.”89  Further, in determining when to impose penalties 
under Section 19(k) for injuries occurring after February 1, 2006, the 
Commission shall consider “whether an Arbitrator has determined that the 
claim is not compensable”90 among other factors.91  In National Manufacturing 
v. Industrial Commission, the court further specified that Section 19(k) of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act “links the penalty to the amount payable at the 
time of the award, not the amount vexatiously withheld from the claimant” 92 
and “defined the [term] ‘amount payable’ as the entire amount of 
compensation awarded, but not including any compensation for permanent 
disability that had not accrued at the time of the penalty hearing.”93 
As a result, the Act provides that the Workers’ Compensation Commission 
“may award penalties for the unreasonable or vexatious delay of payment or 
intentional underpayment of temporary total compensation on the whole 
amount awarded, rather than just the unpaid portion.”94  However, the phrase 
“may” indicates discretion on the part of the Commission to impose 19(k) 
penalties and allows the Commission to base any penalties imposed on the 
portion of the award that has accrued but has not been paid.95 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/19(k) (2008). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  “Among other factors” refers to the determination of whether the employer had made 
payments under Section 8(j) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, which discusses benefits 
received under a group health plan.  See id. 305/8(j). 
 92. Nat’l Mfg. v. Indus. Comm’n, 780 N.E.2d 703, 705–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
 93. Picha, supra note 63, § 5.56, at 5–50; see Nat’l Mfg., 780 N.E.2d at 705–06. 
 94. Picha, supra note 63, § 5.56, at 5–50 (emphasis added). 
 95. See, e.g., Anders v. Indus. Comm’n, 773 N.E.2d 746, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); Kendzora 
v. Enter. Mfg., No. 08 IWCC 864 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2008) (opinion on review); 
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4. Section 16 Attorneys’ Fees 
In workers’ compensation claims, a standard maximum fee which an 
attorney may collect for services rendered is specified under Section 16(a) of 
the Act.  Specifically, the Act provides that 
With respect to any and all proceedings in connection with any initial or 
original claim under this Act, no claim of any attorney for services rendered in 
connection with the securing of compensation for an employee or his 
dependents, whether secured by agreement, order, award or a judgment in any 
court shall exceed 20% of the amount of compensation recovered and paid, 
unless further fees shall be allowed to the attorney upon a hearing by the 
Commission fixing fees, and subject to the other provisions of this Section.96 
In addition to listing the maximum amount recoverable by an attorney in a 
workers’ compensation proceeding, Section 16 also acts as a form of penalty if 
an employer should, in certain circumstances, fail to make payments of 
temporary total disability benefits or compensable medical bills.97  More 
specifically, whenever the Workers’ Compensation Commission determines 
that an employer, his agents, or insurance carrier 
has been guilty of delay or unfairness towards an employee in the adjustment, 
settlement or payment of benefits due such employee . . . or has been guilty of 
unreasonable or vexatious delay, intentional under-payment of compensation 
benefits, or has engaged in frivolous defenses which do not present a real 
controversy, within the purview of the provisions of paragraph (k) of Section 
19 of this Act, the Commission may assess all or any part of the [employee’s] 
attorney’s fees and costs against such employer or its insurance carrier.98 
Since Section 16 specifically refers to an employer’s conduct within the 
purview of Section 19(k) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, attorneys’ fees 
and Section 19(k) penalties for delay are often awarded together for 
“unreasonable or vexatious delay.”99 
II.  THE STATE OF ILLINOIS AS AN EMPLOYER: INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS AND 
EXCEPTIONS 
A. The State as an Employer 
The formal title to the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act is set forth as 
the opening provision of the document: 
 
Clohessy v. Kid Snips, Inc., No. 07 IWCC 0403 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2007) (opinion on 
review). 
 96. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/16a(B) (2008). 
 97. Id. 305/16a. 
 98. Id. 305/16. 
 99. Picha, supra note 63, § 5.59, at 5–52. 
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An Act to promote the general welfare of the people of this State by providing 
compensation for accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of 
employment within this State, and without this State where the contract of 
employment is made within this State; providing for the enforcement and 
administering thereof, and a penalty for its violation, and repealing an Act 
therein named.100 
As the title specifies, the Act was enacted in order “to promote the general 
welfare” of the people of Illinois.101  In addition to the Act’s goals of 
protecting state citizens and employees, the State has several other vested 
interests in the Workers’ Compensation Act: the Illinois legislature also drafted 
and implemented the law into action.102  As a governmental body, the process 
of enacting and repealing laws is an essential State function.  However, the 
State also plays another, equally significant role within the process of workers’ 
compensation claims: employer.103  In fact, the very first provision specified 
within the Workers’ Compensation Act defines an “employer” as: “[t]he State 
and each county, city, town, township, incorporated village, school district, 
body politic, or municipal corporation therein.”104  As a result, the Workers’ 
Compensation Act has clearly specified that the State, in addition to fulfilling 
its role as the legislature, acts as an employer under the Act. 
B. Self-Insured Employers 
One requirement which all employers subject to the provisions of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act must comply with includes the acquisition of 
workers’ compensation insurance.105  Section 4(a) states 
[a]ny employer . . . who shall come within the provisions of Section 3 of this 
Act [regulating self-insured employers], and any other employer who shall 
elect to provide and pay the compensation provided for in this Act shall: . . . 
[i]nsure his entire liability to pay such compensation in some insurance carrier 
authorized, licensed, or permitted to do such insurance business in this State.  
Every policy of an insurance carrier, insuring the payment of compensation 
under this Act shall cover all the employees and the entire compensation 
liability of the insured.106 
Employers who subscribe to the Act have one of two choices in regard to 
insurance: the employer may choose to obtain third party insurance or an 
 
 100. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/1 (2008). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/1(a)(1) (2008). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 305/4(a). 
 106. Id. 
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employer may elect to “self-insure.”107  Those employers who choose to follow 
the provisions set forth in the Act by election shall make such election by 
“filing notice of such election with the Commission, or by insuring his liability 
to pay compensation under this Act in some insurance carrier authorized, 
licensed or permitted to do such insurance business in this State.”108  
Conversely, some employers, including those who are compelled to comply 
with the Workers’ Compensation Act, may choose to self-insure or hold 
themselves responsible for any costs incurred by workers’ compensation 
claims made by their employers in lieu of obtaining a third party insurer.109  If 
an employer chooses to self-insure, it must “[f]ile with the Commission 
annually an application for approval as a self-insurer which shall include a 
current financial statement, and annually, thereafter, an application for renewal 
of self-insurance, which shall include a current financial statement.”110 
Private employers who choose to self-insure must also meet certain 
requirements.111  In order to comply, a private employer must demonstrate 
sufficient financial strength to meet workers’ compensation obligations in a 
timely manner, and must provide security as required by the Commission.112  
According to the Commission, if a self-insured employer is financially 
unwilling or unable to pay its workers’ compensation obligations, a group 
known as the Illinois Self-Insurers Advisory Board113 is empowered to and will 
 
 107. Id. 305/2(a). 
 108. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2(a) (2008). 
 109. See id. 305/4(a). 
 110. Id. 305/4(a)(1). 
 111. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7100.70 (2010). 
 112. Id. 
 113. The Self-Insurers Advisory Board is created through Section 4a-1 of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act.  820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/4a–1 (2008).  According to the Act, the Advisory 
Board is 
for the purpose of providing for the continuation of workers’ compensation and 
occupational disease benefits due and unpaid or interrupted due to the inability of an 
insolvent self-insurer . . . to meet its compensation obligations when the employers’ 
financial resources, security deposit, guaranty agreements, surety agreements and excess 
insurance are either inadequate or not immediately accessible for the payment of benefits, 
and to review and recommend to the Chairman of the Commission the disposition of all 
initial and renewal applications to self-insure filed by private self-insurers under this Act 
and the Workers’ Occupational Disease Act. 
Id.  Additionally, Section 4a–3 of the Act provides for the selection of Advisory Board members 
and specifies that “[t]he Board shall consist of the Chairman of the Illinois Workers’ 
Compensation Commission, as Chairman of the Board, and six other members appointed by the 
Chairman who shall be expert in matters of self-insurance for workers’ compensation liability.  
One such member shall represent the general public.” Id. 305/4a–3(a).  A vacancy on the Board 
“shall occur upon his resignation, death, or conviction of a felony,” and also specifies that the 
Chairman may remove a Board Member from office upon a formal finding of “incompetence, 
neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.” Id. 305/4a–3(b). 
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assume the outstanding obligations of the insolvent insurer.114  The role of the 
Advisory Board is to take all necessary steps to collect, recover, and enforce 
the security posted by the self-insurer.115  Further, future administration of an 
employer’s workers’ compensation claims will be determined by the nature of 
the security posted by the employer.116  If the employer is a current self-insurer 
who fails to provide sufficient security, such employer’s self-insurance 
privileges can be terminated.117 
C. State of Illinois’s Exemption from Self-Insured Requirements 
Since the State is required to comply with the provisions of the Act,118 it 
has also elected to self-insure under the Workers’ Compensation Act.119  
However, since the State is not a private employer, it is not subject to the 
requirements which other, private employers must meet in order to self-
insure.120  Pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Code, public entities, 
including the State, appear to be excepted from seeking approval from the 
Commission should they choose to self-insure.121  Conversely, the Code 
provides that all private employers must submit an annual report to the 
Commission seeking approval each year.122 
III.  ILLINOIS’S FINANCIAL DURESS AND REPERCUSSIONS 
A. Illinois’s Financial Crisis 
In addition to the problems faced by the national economy, the State has 
also recently suffered from severe financial hardships.123  The Illinois state 
budget has been considered one of the worst in the nation, and problems are 
estimated to grow worse before they begin to resolve.124  Illinois, it has been 
 
 114. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/4a–6(a) (2008). 
 115. Id. 
 116. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7100.70(c)(3) (2010). 
 117. Id. § 7100.70(e)(2). 
 118. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/3 (2008). 
 119. Id. 305/4(a)(1). 
 120. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 7100.70(a)(1)(A) (2010). 
 121. Id. (excluding the State and other public entities from the definition of “private 
employer”). 
 122. Id. § 7100.70(a)(2)(A). 
 123. See Deanna Bellandi, Illinois Mired in Financial Crisis, ST. JOURNAL-REGISTER (Sept. 
18, 2010, 10:17 AM), http://www.sj-r.com/breaking/x191996969/Illinois-mired-in-financial-
crisis (describing the State’s $13 billion deficit and backlog of unpaid bills); Mike Riopell, 
Illinois on Financial ‘Top 10’ Worst List, PANTOGRAPH, Nov. 12, 2009, at A3 (noting that 
financially, Illinois is among the “worst-off” states in the country); Terry Savage, ‘Our State Is 
$120 Billion Short!’, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 23, 2010, at 26 (“Illinois is bankrupt.”); Secter, supra 
note 12 (describing the State’s budget deficit). 
 124. Riopell, supra note 123. 
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speculated, “has a long history of spending more than it takes in.”125  Bob 
Secter, a reporter for the Chicago Tribune, writes, “[the] Illinois government is 
staring down the barrel of an explosive financial mess, and perhaps nothing 
frames the danger better than two big numbers.”126  Secter estimates the first 
number to be $26 billion, “the grand total that lawmakers have allotted this 
year for the meat of what the state does: funding education, health care, child 
welfare, public safety and the machinery of the government itself.”127  
Numerous sources place the current budgetary deficit at approximately $13 
billion, including “$8 billion in unpaid bills to social service agencies, 
pharmacies and others.”128 
The financial strains placed on the State government have left many to 
question exactly how and which outstanding bills will be paid.  Illinois 
Governor Pat Quinn has promised “[e]very bill will be paid by the end of this 
year.”129  However, Quinn was actually referring to bills submitted before the 
end of the fiscal year in 2010, which ended on June 30, 2010.130  While the 
State is taking responsibility for these bills, new debts are accruing.131  
Conversely, Governor Quinn has yet to make any promises regarding the 
payment of bills submitted after June 30, 2010.132  The repercussions of these 
bill payment strategies could mean “there’s no guarantee that a vendor who did 
work for the state in August, after the new fiscal year started, will see payment 
anytime before next year.”133  Some State vendors have even been waiting as 
long as seven months to receive their payments.134  In fact, Illinois’s chief 
“bill-payer,” Comptroller Dan Hynes, has stated that the State owes upwards of 
$5 billion to statewide schools, universities, child-care centers and rehab 
centers.135  Hynes calls this phenomenon “obscene,”136 telling the New York 
Times: “[t]his is not some esoteric budget issue; we are not paying bills for 
absolutely essential services.”137  As a result, the State has been unable to pay 
the vast majority of its bills, and owes billions to numerous statewide 
 
 125. Id. (quoting Susan Urahn, Managing Director of the Pew Center for the States). 
 126. Secter, supra note 12. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Monica Davey, Questions Persisting as Illinois Raises Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2011, 
at A16; see Secter, supra note 12. 
 129. Bellandi, supra note 123. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Bellandi, supra note 123. 
 135. Savage, supra note 123. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Michael Powell, Illinois Stops Paying Its Bills, But Can’t Stop Digging Hole, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A1. 
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institutions.138  In addition to the schools, universities, child-care centers and 
rehab centers who are owed money from the State,139 the State has been 
shirking its duties as an employer by failing to pay its employees’ medical bills 
and even penalties which have been imposed by the Workers’ Compensation 
Commission.140 
B. State of Illinois’s Payment of Workers’ Compensation Medical Bills and 
Penalties 
1. Background 
As a result of the State’s recent financial problems, many areas of fiscal 
responsibility have been neglected and many of the State’s bills have remained 
unpaid for a period of up to seven months, while more debt continues to 
accrue.141  While some organizations have received more publicity in terms of 
its unpaid bills, for example schools and child-care centers,142 other aspects of 
the State’s budget, such as payment of its employees’ workers’ compensation 
benefits, have been just as severely affected, but have only just begun to 
receive any media attention.143  However, due to the State’s financial 
constraints, the State as an employer has been making delinquent payments on 
the medical bills accrued by its employees for work-related injuries.144 
As previously discussed, when liability for an employee’s claim is not 
disputed by an employer or the claim has been adjudicated compensable by the 
Workers’ Compensation Commission,145 an employer is required to reimburse 
medical providers for treatments given to its employee to “cure or relieve from 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the State’s delinquent payment of its employees’ 
workers’ compensation medical bills).  Additionally, in response to the State’s “fiscal 
emergency,” the Illinois legislature passed a bill in January 2011 that raises individual income tax 
rates by approximately sixty-six percent.  Davey, supra note 128.  Although the decision to 
increase taxes has been praised by Pat Quinn, the governor of Illinois, many wonder whether this 
tax package will be “enough to solve the state’s crisis.”  Id. 
 141. Bellandi, supra note 123. 
 142. Savage, supra note 123. 
 143. See Pawlaczyk & Hundsdorfer, supra note 8. 
 144. See the following cases, which describe the delinquent payments made by the State: 
Dowdy v. Vienna Corr. Ctr., No. 08 WC 05672 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010) (order); 
Mabrey v. Ill. Dept. of Corrs., No. 07 WC 09331 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010) (order); 
McDonald v. Pinckneyville Corr. Ctr., No. 04 WC 13082 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010) 
(order); Studt v. Menard Corr. Ctr., No. 08 WC 55780 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010) 
(order); Kinder v. Choate Mental Health Ctr., No. 08 WC 48796 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 
2010) (Dibble, Arb.), aff’d No. 10 I.W.C.C. 0828 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010); Wece v. 
Pinckneyville Corr. Ctr., No. 08 WC 43914 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2009) (Dibble, Arb.), 
aff’d, 11 I.W.C.C. 0670 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2011). 
 145. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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the effects” of a work-related injury.146  Additionally, if such payments are not 
made pursuant to the time-frame given in the Medical Fee Schedule of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act, an employee may make a petition for penalties 
under several provisions of the Act.147  As a result of the State’s financial 
difficulties, the State as an employer has been failing to pay medical providers 
for services provided to its employees for work-related injuries.148  The State’s 
employees, as a result of these late payments, have asserted their rights under 
the Workers’ Compensation Act to file petitions for penalties.149  However, 
rather than pay the penalties incurred by late payment to medical providers, the 
State has asserted it should be due leniency and has unilaterally exempted itself 
from payment of the penalties based on the argument that the State is currently 
a governmental body under financial duress.150 
2. Rationale for Filing of Penalties 
As previously discussed, penalties may be imposed against an employer in 
various circumstances, but typically an employer must fail to make payments 
to medical providers for an injured employee’s accrued medical bills.151  
However, in order to receive any type of additional compensation in the form 
of penalties, the injured employee must make a motion to the Workers’ 
Compensation Commission asking for relief in the form of monetary penalties 
against his or her employer.152  When an employee files a motion for penalties 
against his or her employer, the desired result is generally not only to secure 
additional compensation, but to discourage the employer from engaging in 
delinquent payments and to protect the financial interests of the medical 
providers and employees.153 
While the failure of an employer (such as the State) to pay an employee’s 
compensable medical bills seemingly impacts medical providers most directly, 
it can also severely affect employees.  For example, when a doctor’s office or 
hospital does not receive reimbursement from an employer, the medical 
provider will often seek compensation from another source—the injured 
worker directly, despite the fact that the employer is bound through the 
Workers’ Compensation Act to pay such expenses.154  As a result of the State’s 
recent lack of financial resources, many State employees have received 
 
 146. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8(a) (2008). 
 147. See id. 305/16, 305/19(k), 305/19(l). 
 148. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 149. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 150. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 151. See supra Part I.D.1. 
 152. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/16, 305/19(k), 305/19(l) (2008). 
 153. As has been discussed, the penalty provisions of the Act allow for additional payments 
not only to the employee, but also to the provider of medical services.  See id. 
 154. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/8(a) (2008). 
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collection notices regarding their unpaid medical bills accrued from their 
work-related accident.155  The results of these delinquent payments can not 
only include collection notices, but can also drastically affect an employee’s 
credit score.156 
In addition to receipt of collection notices and an affected credit score, 
some State employees have been denied necessary medical treatment or 
medication due to the State’s failure to pay bills in a timely manner.  In the 
case of Maue v. State of Illinois Menard Correctional Center, an injured prison 
guard attempted to see a local physician to treat him for his injuries, but was 
denied treatment due to the State’s “failure to timely authorize and pay for 
medical treatment.”157  Similarly, in a letter addressed to attorney Mr. Rich, 
who represents numerous injured workers, the Injured Workers Pharmacy, a 
group which provides medication to injured workers,158 stated the following: 
As you are aware, Injured Workers Pharmacy (IWP) has been providing your 
client(s) with their workers’ compensation prescription medication for some 
time now.  You may also have heard that the State of Illinois is facing serious 
financial hardship which has unfortunately impacted our ability to continue to 
service your state-employed clients. 
IWP has been providing medication to the majority of state-employed injured 
workers for up to a year with minimal reimbursement from the State of Illinois.  
Claims typically take close to one year before any payment is received, and 
when/if payment does take place it is at a greatly reduced rate.  Therefore, it is 
with much regret that we must inform you that IWP will no longer be able to 
provide these clients with medication moving forward. . . . 
This is an unfortunate consequence of the financial condition of the State of 
Illinois.159 
As a result, the financial duress of the State has not only affected the 
ability of medical providers to collect payments on overdue bills, but also 
caused State employees to suffer numerous hardships including the receipt of 
 
 155. McDonald v. Pickneyville Corr. Ctr., No. 04 WC 13082 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 
2010) (order); Petitioner’s Statement of Exceptions and Supporting Brief at 2, Starkweather v. 
Menard Corr. Ctr., No. 08 WC 30919 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2009), aff’d, 11 I.W.C.C. 
0670 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2011). 
 156. See Pawlaczyk & Hundsdorfer, supra note 8 (quoting attorney Thomas C. Rich, “‘I have 
clients whose ratings have gone down the toilet,’ because the state is late or fails to pay”). 
 157. Petitioner’s Statement of Exceptions and Supporting Brief at 2, Maue v. Menard Corr. 
Ctr., No. 08 WC 43915 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2009), aff’d No. 11 I.W.C.C. 0672 (Ill. 
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2011). 
 158. See IWP: THE PATIENT ADVOCATE PHARMACY, http://www.iwpharmacy.com/De 
fault.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2011). 
 159. Letter from Injured Workers Pharmacy to Law Office of Thomas Rich (Dec. 6, 2010) 
(on file with author). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] THE DELINQUENT STATE 321 
collection notices,160 a negative impact on credit scores,161 and in some cases, 
even a denial of necessary medical treatment or medication.162  In cases where 
injured employees of the State suffer such consequences, the only remedy 
available to them involves the imposition of penalties against the State, since, 
as previously discussed, the State’s self-insured status as an employer cannot 
be revoked should it be unable or unwilling to pay its employees’ bills.163  
Therefore, especially in cases when an employee has suffered financially as a 
result of the State’s delinquent payments on compensable medical bills, 
penalties should be imposed and awarded to such employees not only to 
discourage the State from engaging in practices of non-payment, but to provide 
some financial relief to injured employees barely able to make ends meet. 
3. State’s Historical Payment of Penalties 
Although the State’s financial duress has been a fairly recent issue within 
the past two to three years, the question of whether the State is subject to the 
provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act which require timely payment 
of medical bills or the imposition of specific penalties has been historically 
analyzed in numerous instances by the Illinois courts.164  For example, in 
Martin v. Giordano, the Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded 
penalties under Section 19(k) for “unreasonable and vexatious” behavior in 
late payment of medical bills.165  After the Commission ordered payment of 
these penalties, the State as defendant, however, refused payment based on the 
argument that “the State [was] not subject to section 19(k)”166 as a result of 
sovereign immunity.167  More specifically, the State contended that since 
liability on the State was not “unequivocally set forth in section 19(k)” of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act, State liability did not exist.168  On appeal, the 
appellate court held not only that Section 19(k) of the Act did in fact apply to 
the State, but also that since other employers may not “pick and choose what 
‘compensation’ they will pay,” neither may the State.169  Furthermore, the 
Martin court made a pivotal distinction in terms of the State’s obligations as an 
employer: that since Section 19(k) of the Act never uses the term 
 
 160. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra notes 156 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
 163. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 50, § 7100.70 (2010). 
 164. See, e.g., Martin v. Giordano, 450 N.E.2d 933, 934 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Christopher v. 
Ill. Dep’t of Corr., No. 07 IWCC 0257 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2007) (opinion on review). 
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 169. Id. at 935. 
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“penalties,”170 but simply provides for “additional compensation,” when there 
is an intentional delay of payment, the State had a choice to either pay timely 
benefits due and owing under the Act or pay additional compensation under 
Section 19(k) of the Act.171 
Similarly, in Christopher v. State of Illinois Department of Corrections, 
the Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed the arbitrator’s award of 
additional compensation under Section 19(k) against the State for failure to 
timely pay medical bills.172  Although Christopher was resolved by the 
Commission in 2007, the State had already begun to assert a lack of funds as 
its defense for failing to pay its employees’ medical bills or Section 19(k) 
penalties.173  The arbitrator noted that the employee’s unpaid medical bills 
were admitted into evidence without objection and that the outstanding 
balances remaining on the bills were approximately two to seven months 
old.174  The State, in response, offered no indication as to when the bills would 
be paid, but simply stated they would be paid as soon as funds were made 
available and cited insufficiency of funds as the reason for its delinquent 
payments.175  However, in determining that Section 19(k) was applicable to the 
State in this instance, the arbitrator determined that the State’s defense of 
insufficient funding did “not meet the burden of justifying the delay in medical 
benefit payment.”176  After reviewing the affidavit provided by the State 
regarding insufficiency of funds, the arbitrator held “[t]his defense would not 
be available to a private employer and the Act does not except out the State of 
Illinois for liability for failure to pay benefits timely.”177  Additionally, 
[t]he State has intentionally chosen not to pay this obligation.  Respondent has 
unilaterally decided to place the burden of medical expense payment, and the 
risks associated with non-payment, on its employees. . . .  Self-insured’s, like 
this Respondent, are in part granted their status by a promise to satisfy their 
statutory obligations.178 
Furthermore, the arbitrator concluded the decision with a sweeping statement 
indicating the importance of employer compliance with these provisions: “[t]he 
failure to pay medical bills has a chilling effect on the Worker’s [sic] 
Compensation Act and prevents [employees] from seeking needed 
 
 170. Martin, 450 N.E.2d at 935. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Christopher v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., No. 07 IWCC 0257 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 
2007) (opinion on review). 
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 176. Id. 
 177. Christopher, No. 07 IWCC 0257. 
 178. Id. 
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treatment.”179  Through this statement, the Workers’ Compensation arbitrator 
and Commission underscored the importance of the State’s compliance with 
payment of medical bills and resulting penalties if the bills are not timely 
paid.180 
4. Recent Inconsistent Commission Rulings 
Despite the fact that workers’ compensation arbitrators and the 
Commission have historically awarded penalties against the State under the 
Workers’ Compensation Act for failure to pay medical bills,181 numerous 
recent decisions have been handed down from the Commission suggesting that 
the law in this area may not be well-settled.182 
For example, in the case of McDonald v. Pinckneyville Correctional 
Center, the employee and his attorney petitioned for penalties against the State, 
his employer, for delinquent payment of medical bills.183  In a determination 
made by the Commission regarding the imposition of these penalties, the 
Commission issued an order dated September 8, 2010, which affirmed the 
award of medical compensation and penalties under Sections 16, 19(k) and 
19(l) of the Act.184  Additionally, the Commission found that the employee and 
his attorney had requested on four separate occasions that the State pay 
specific outstanding medical bills to Washington University Physicians.185  
 
 179. Id. 
 180. For a more in-depth look at past Commission decisions underscoring the premise that the 
State is subject to payment of penalties, see the following cases: Devine v. State, No. 08 IWCC 
0131 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2008) (opinion on review) (affirming the arbitrator’s order to 
the State to pay benefits under Section 19(k), 19(l) and Section 16 attorneys’ fees for failure to 
timely pay benefits); Holbrook v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., No. 08 IWCC 1430 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. 
Comm’n 2008) (opinion on review) (affirming arbitrator’s holding that a failure to tender any 
evidence to substantiate the State’s refusal to pay benefits is unreasonable and vexatious in 
nature); Giordano v. Chester Mental Health Ctr., No. 07 IWCC 0397 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. 
Comm’n 2007) (opinion on review) (affirming arbitrator’s award of additional compensation 
under Section 19(k) for State’s delay in payment of medical bills); Lee v. State, No. 07 IWCC 
0163 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2007) (opinion on review) (affirming arbitrator’s holding 
that a defense of insufficient funds is not available to a private employer, so it is not available to 
the State); and Zemlyn v. State, No. 06 IWCC 1138 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2006) 
(opinion on review) (affirming arbitrator’s holding that insufficient funds available to State does 
not justify delay in benefit payment). 
 181. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 182. Compare McDonald v. Pinckneyville Corr. Ctr., No. 04 WC 13082 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. 
Comm’n 2010) (order), with Kinder v. Choate Mental Health Ctr., 10 IWCC 0828 (Ill. Workers’ 
Comp. Comm’n. 2010) (opinion on review) (upholding the arbitrator’s determination that 
“governmental bodies during times of financial stress are entitled to leniency and broad latitude in 
payment of medical bills”). 
 183. McDonald, No. 04 WC 13082. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
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Through no fault of his own, the Commission determined, the employee had 
continued to receive collection notices regarding the unpaid bills in question.186  
As a result of these factors, the Commission concluded that the State’s failure 
to pay the bills in question, despite stipulating to all the facts regarding 
compensability, constituted an “unreasonable and vexatious” delay in payment 
which justified the imposition of penalties.187 According to the Commission, 
the State also failed to assert a “good and just cause as to why it has yet to pay 
said bill.”188 
Similarly in Studt v. Menard Correctional Center/State of Illinois, while 
awarding penalties to the employee in question, the Workers’ Compensation 
Commission reemphasized the role which the employer plays in justifying a 
delay of compensation.189  Specifically, the Commission noted that “[w]hen a 
delay in paying compensation has occurred, the employer bears the burden of 
justifying the delay.”190  Whether the employer’s conduct justifies the 
imposition of penalties, similarly, should be considered in terms of 
reasonableness and is a factual question for the Commission.191  In Studt, the 
Commission concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of justifying the 
delay of payment, and that its actions constituted “unreasonable and vexatious” 
behavior.192 
The Commission decision of Taylor v. Vienna Correctional Center also 
affirmed an arbitrator’s award of penalties under Sections 19(k) and 19(l) 
against the State.193  Most significantly, the Commission’s discussion in Taylor 
dealt with the State’s repeated assertion that its lack of funds should excuse 
delinquent payment of medical bills and penalties.194  The State contended that 
the precedent set by Brown v. State of Illinois, Elgin Mental Health Center was 
binding on the Commission and the decision of Brown should be adhered to in 
Taylor.195  According to the State, Brown stood for the premise that 
“governmental bodies during time of financial stress are entitled to leniency 
and broad latitude in payment of medical bills due to financial constraint.”196  
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. McDonald, No. 04 WC 13082. 
 189. Studt v. Menard Corr. Ctr., No. 08 WC 55780 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010) 
(order). 
 190. Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. of Chicago v. Indus. Comm’n, 442 N.E.2d 861, 865 (Ill. 1982); 
Smith v. Indus. Comm’n, 525 N.E.2d 81, 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)). 
 191. Id. (citing Avon Prods., Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 412 N.E.2d 468, 470 (Ill. 1980); Boker 
v. Ill. Indus. Comm’n, 489 N.E.2d 913, 918 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Taylor v. Vienna Corr. Ctr., No. 10 IWCC 0990 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n 2010) 
(opinion on review). 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] THE DELINQUENT STATE 325 
However, the Commission in Taylor found the State’s reading of Brown was 
simply dicta and instead recited the holding of Brown as follows: 
“[t]he Commission has given broad latitude to governmental bodies when the 
delay in payment of compensation is due to financial constraints.  However, in 
the instant case, [the State] failed to show that financial constraints contributed 
to their failure to act in a timely manner with the processing of an above the 
red line settlement contract.”197 
The Taylor Commission, in determining the inapplicability of Brown, noted 
that Brown did not actually cite any legal authority supporting the proposition 
that governmental bodies are due leniency in times of financial duress.198  
Rather, the Taylor Commission established, in conformity with Martin v. 
Giordano, Section 19(k) penalties apply to all employers regardless of their 
formation.199  As a result, the Commission “decline[d] to create a different 
standard for imposing penalties and attorneys’ fees for governmental entities 
under Sections 19(l) and 16.”200  Therefore, since the Commission had 
imposed penalties and attorneys’ fees in numerous similar cases involving 
private sector employers, the award of penalties against the State in Taylor was 
warranted.201 
In October of 2010, the Workers’ Compensation Commission handed 
down one of its most recent decisions mandating payment of penalties by the 
State in Browning v. State of Illinois, Shawnee Correctional Center.202  In 
response to the employee’s petition for penalties, the State cited its “financial 
duress,” the prior Commission decision of Brown v. Elgin Mental Health 
Center, and a “new” provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act allowing 
one percent interest.203  In awarding penalties to the employee under all three 
provisions of the Act, the Commission specified simply that it “declines to 
relieve [the State] of its obligation to satisfy such an award due to claimed 
‘financial duress.’  Many employers, and employees, in this State are under 
such duress and yet continue to meet their financial obligations.”204 
However, in the face of the recent financial duress the State has been 
experiencing, the Commission has been somewhat more reluctant to impose 
penalties upon the State in all of the circumstances which, in the past, would 
 
 197. Taylor, No. 10 IWCC 0990 (quoting Brown, 94 I.I.C. 0892). 
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 199. Id. (relying on Martin v. Giordano, 450 N.E.2d 933 (1983)). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Browning v. Shawnee Corr. Ctr., No. 05 WC 54547 (Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n. 
2010) (order). 
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have been deemed proper to do so by precedent.205  In Kinder v. State of 
Illinois/Choate Mental Health Center, the workers’ compensation arbitrator 
and Commission denied the imposition of penalties to a similarly situated 
employee.206  In his decision, the arbitrator determined that although the 
employee’s bills were six months overdue, the employee had been able to 
receive additional medical treatment and her credit status had not been affected 
by the State’s inability to pay her outstanding bills.207  More importantly, the 
arbitrator also addressed the issue of the State’s financial difficulties and 
determined that “governmental bodies during times of financial stress are 
entitled to leniency and broad latitude in payment of medical bills duet [sic] to 
financial constraint.”208  Additionally, the arbitrator and Commission further 
determined that instead of imposing penalties on the State as an employer, the 
Workers’ Compensation Act provided a remedy to medical providers in the 
form of interest payments on the balance owed.209 
In two additional, recently-issued, Workers’ Compensation Commission 
orders, the Commission again declined to impose penalties against the State for 
delinquent payments of medical bills.210  First, in Dowdy v. Vienna 
Correctional Center, the Commission stated, “[t]aking judicial notice of the 
state’s financial difficulties, the Commission finds that  [the State’s] failure to 
timely pay said medical bills was not unreasonable or vexatious” and as a 
result, the Commission denied the employee’s petition for penalties.211  
Similarly, in Mabrey v. State of Illinois Department of Corrections, the 
Commission issued an order simply finding “that the State of Illinois [sic] lack 
of funding for payment of these bills does not amount to a vexatious or 
unreasonable delay in payment.”212 
5. The Need for Consistent Rulings in favor of Penalties 
As a result of the aforementioned orders and decisions handed down by the 
Commission over the past few years, it appears clear that a consistent ruling on 
the issue of whether the State’s financial duress constitutes an exception to the 
payment of penalties does not exist.  In attempting to reconcile these 
determinations, it is difficult to understand why the Commission has chosen to 
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award penalties to some employees while excluding others in similarly situated 
circumstances.  However, one distinguishable characteristic the arbitrator and 
Commission seem to implicitly rely on appears in both McDonald and Kinder.  
In McDonald, penalties were awarded to an employee,213 whereas in Kinder 
the petitioner was denied similar penalties.214  While determining that penalties 
were in fact an appropriate remedy in McDonald, the arbitrator noted that the 
employee had been receiving collection notices regarding the bills which 
remained unpaid by the State.215  In Kinder, by contrast, where penalties were 
denied, the arbitrator determined that although the employee’s bills remained 
outstanding, the employee’s credit status had not been affected by the State’s 
inability to pay for her treatment.216  As a result, external factors, such as the 
credit statuses of employees, can guide the rulings of workers’ compensation 
arbitrators and commissioners in determining when to apply penalties against a 
financially-strapped governmental body. 
However, despite the sole distinction seen between Kinder and McDonald, 
which may have led the Commission to different results regarding the 
imposition of penalties, the factors which govern the remaining Commission 
decisions remain unidentified.  When the employee’s credit status or ability to 
receive medical treatment is not mentioned by the Commission,217 penalties 
have been both imposed and denied, with no accompanying rationale 
provided.218  As a result, although information regarding an employee’s credit 
status or ability to receive medical treatment can be probative and even 
indicative of the Commission’s decision when it has been inserted into the 
claim, when these factors are absent, the determinations of the Workers’ 
Compensation Commission have remained overwhelmingly inconsistent and 
unpredictable. 
In fact, the Act remains silent on the issue of whether an employee’s credit 
status and similar external evidence should be considered by the Commission 
in determining when to impose penalties.  The standard of “unreasonable or 
vexatious”219 behavior, the criteria for imposing penalties under Sections 16 
and 19(k) of the Act, has been defined by Illinois courts in numerous 
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instances.220  However, court-defined characterizations of “unreasonable and 
vexatious” have never included delay in payment’s effect upon an employee.  
Additionally, while the Commission has discussed and ruled on whether the 
State’s financial circumstances constitute “unreasonable and vexatious” 
behavior,221 specific factors which accompany the State’s fiscal situation have 
not been fully discussed or adjudicated. 
Regardless of the individual facts which supplement each claim, e.g., 
whether the employee has been affected financially by the State’s delinquent 
payments, the behavior of the State remains the same in each circumstance.222  
Essentially, in all of the aforementioned claims and circumstances, the State 
has shirked its duty to pay outstanding medical bills in a timely manner,223 and 
has additionally avoided the alternative responsibility of penalties.224  As a 
result, it seems the State’s failure to pay benefits to its employees due to its 
poor financial planning should constitute “unreasonable and vexatious” 
behavior, especially considering this behavior may cause its employees.  As 
the Martin court aptly articulated, “the State of Illinois had a choice.”225  The 
Act required that the State either timely pay benefits or give additional 
compensation in the form of penalties.226  Since other employers may not “pick 
and choose” the compensation they will pay, “[n]either may the State of 
Illinois.”227  As a result, since the behavior of the State in failing to pay 
medical bills or penalties is equivalent to the conduct of all other employers 
who subscribe to the Workers’ Compensation Act, it is appropriate that the 
State should also be required to fulfill the same obligations as other employers 
who subscribe to the Act and either choose to make timely payments of 
medical bills or accept the imposition of penalties. 
CONCLUSION 
In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., one of the seminal cases in Illinois workers’ 
compensation law, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the Workers’ 
Compensation Act, as a piece of legislation, deprives employees of the right to 
sue their employers in tort.228  However, since employees give up this common 
law right, the Act provides protection to these claimants in the form of “prompt 
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and equitable compensation for injuries.”229  As a result, due to the exclusive 
nature of a workers’ compensation remedy, the importance of providing 
employee claimants with a sure award of compensation has been widely 
acknowledged by the courts.230  Payment of benefits to an injured employee, 
including compensable medical bills, therefore, are rights afforded to an 
employee pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act and are an integral part 
of an employee’s statutory rights.231  When an employer fails to comply with 
its statutory obligations to make such payments, penalties are available to be 
assessed against the employer and payable to the employee in reparation for 
the employer’s “unreasonable or vexatious” behavior.232 
The State, as a governmental body as well as an employer, has been 
experiencing a considerable amount of financial duress for the past several 
years due to poor budgeting.233  Due to such fiscal problems, the State as an 
employer has shirked its duty to provide its employees (and relevant medical 
providers) with their appropriate remedies under the Act.  The result of the 
State’s failure to pay its employees’ compensable medical bills has had a 
devastating effect on the State’s employees as well as the judicial 
determinations of the Workers’ Compensation Commission.234  While 
employees have petitioned for the imposition of penalties against the State in 
circumstances where the State has failed to pay the relevant compensable 
medical bills, the Commission has handed down numerous inconsistent and 
unpredictable decisions regarding when such penalties are enforceable.235  In 
fact, most employee claims made against the State for penalties are practically 
indistinguishable.236  The one guiding factor provided by the Commission on 
the issue of penalties involves the question of whether an employee has 
received collection notices or has been unable to receive continued medical 
treatment.237  However, when an employee’s credit status has not been made 
an issue by either party, the Commission’s decisions still remain ambiguous 
and conflicting as to whether penalties should be assessed against the State. 
As a result, the Workers’ Compensation Commission has not provided a 
clear or reliable precedent on the issue of penalties against the State for delay 
resulting from financial duress.  However, other private employers have 
engaged in similar behavior and were required to either pay its employees’ 
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medical bills in a timely manner or accept the imposition of penalties.238  
Likewise, since the State is both a governmental body and an employer, it 
seems unjust that it receives preferential treatment and an exemption from the 
rules which bind other employers through the Workers’ Compensation Act.  
Given that the State, through the legislature, implemented the Act into law, it 
seems even more compelling that the State should, through the Commission, 
either comply with its provisions or accept the consequence of penalties.  By 
forcing the State to comply with its own policies, scores of injured workers 
who have suffered the financial consequences of the State’s failure to pay their 
compensable medical bills would receive much needed, just and equitable 
relief. 
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